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ABSTRACT 
A Postmodern Union: Institutions and Identities 
in Europe. (April 2002) 
Lacy Cooper 
Department of Political Science 
Texas A&M University 
Fellows Advisor: Dr. John Robertson 
Department of Political Science 
The European Union has often been depicted as a postmodern pohtical 
institution, primarily because it both transcends and erases the traditional boundaries ol 
the modern nation-state. The implications of this conceptualization are far-reaching. For 
example, what elTects might the nature of the EU have on public opinion'? How might a 
postmodemist respond differently to thc Union than a modernist? Is the familiar 
nationalist-Europeanist cleavage asserted by many to be the fundamental division of 
European identities adequate to explain support for the Union? Using Eurobarometer 
data I explore these questions about Furopean identities and affect toward FU policies. It 
appears that two additional- postmodern- identities co-exist alongside the nationalist and 
the europeanist. These are the dual-identifier and the non-identifier who repeatedly 
display even more radical europeanist and nationalist tendencies, respectively, than their 
conventional counterparts. By weighting the votes of the European Council I illustrate 
that understanding all five European identity types is crucial for decisionmaking in the 
EU as policymakers attempt to build a qualified majority coalition among the fifteen 
Member States. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When the Second World War came to a close, a treaty was sqmed by six 
European countries in a coordinated effort to overcome their tendencies to engage in war 
and destruction. The hope was that firm economic ties among the Member States would 
hinder the rise of armed conflict and eventually secure peace for all of Furope. Half a 
century later, this community of nations, renamed the European Union, has broadened its 
scope. It now includes fifleen Member States with an eye toward further expansion in 
the coming years as several Eastern European nations wait anxiously to be admitted. 
The EU is a political union unlike any the world has ever seen before; having 
been created when the modern era was fading and postmodernism was on the rise. Its 
institutions reflect this global setting. The most obvious manifestation of Furope's 
postmodern shift is found in the supranational nature of its governing body, which 
increasingly transcends and erases nation-state borders. Since the 17 century, the is 
nation-state has been the world's primary political unit but it is no longer a concrete 
entity. Lines that once contained each nation-state's sovereignty within a specific 
territorial boundary are breaking down; and instead of trying to patch the leaks, 
European leaders choose to embrace the phenomenon playing out before them. In 
response to the transition to postmodernism that the world is experiencing, Europe is 
fashioning a political institution well suited for its environment. 
This thesis follows the style and format of, /ournal of'Poldics. 
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Postmodernism has, in varying degrees, affected all areas of European society: 
politics and economics, institutions and individuals, elites and masses. Some react with 
distaste clinging ever more strongly to modernity while others embrace the 
postmodernism drive. Europe is being pulled in two directions and the rifts between 
governments and individuals are gradually widening. As a result, new cleavages are 
emergmg between modern and postmodern individuals and their states that will 
profoundly affect the future progress of European uniftcation. 
POSTMODERNISM DEFINED 
The birth of postmodern thought cannot be pinpointed to an exact date in history 
but is believed to have begun in the latter half of the twentieth century. Like any 
philosophical or artistic movement, its tenets are not easily isolated since many 
individuals are involved in the creation and adaptation of its principles. Nonetheless, it is 
necessary for the purpose of pohtical science theory to express postmodernism as though 
it were a complete set of uniform views. Yet the essentialism inherent in defining 
postmodern thought actually violates postmodernism itself, which advocates the absence 
of concrete foundations and the existence of a constantly contested political space. 
Although there is no way to wholly reconcile this discrepancy (an unfortunate flaw in 
any scientific methodology), the definition of postmodernism can be fragmented. It can 
be made the site of various authors' expressions- authors whose voices are not ahvays in 
tune. By compiling several diverse authors' contributions to the meaning of 
postmodernism, the definition itself, though concrete in the context of this paper, is 
heterogeneous as it stands on its own. 
Postmodernism is both the continuation and rejection of modernism and thus can 
best be understood in relation to its counterpart. Modernism is founded on a belief in 
progress, an illustration of which is Henry Ford's assembly line. It asserts that one can 
move through a set of consecutive phases following a blueprint that has been laid out by 
the presumably more advanced Western nations, and reach a virtuous end. Modernism is 
characterized by its pursuit of the following ideals: industrialization, urbanization, 
democratization, nationalization, and Westernization. 
Postmodernism rejects the notion that virtuous ends are reached by following a 
step-by-step process and that the 'West' is the supreme moral authority in the world. 
Globalization, fragmentation, digitalization, and decentralization are all ideals that 
characterize this era. Postmodernism claims that deciding which ideals are good or right 
and what it means to be advanced is subjective; and because there is no objective reality, 
all peoples should be given a voice in the world. The increasing interdependence of 
global economic and political realms has encouraged the acceptance of new voices. 
Furthermore, the Internet has integrated public and private spaces around the world. 
Because the European Union was created dunng the postmodern era, its institutions 
reflect these ideals. 
WHAT MAKES THE EtJ SO POSTMODERN? 
The Modern Nation-State 
To appreciate the postmodern nature of the European Union, one must first 
understand the character of its modern counterpart, the nation-state. A state is defined as 
a government that exercises authority over a territory while a nation is a group of people 
that claims to share a common bond, such as language, ancestry, myths, or customs. A 
state represents power, while a nation represents community. European nations often 
claim to have ethnoreligious ties that distinguish them either from each other or from 
non-Europeans. Though both nations and states existed before the 17'" century, the 
combination of nation and state is an ideal of the modern era. Before the modern era, the 
centers of sovereign authority were viewed as points on a map around which power, 
stemming from the Church, seemed to radiate immeasurably. The nation-state arose out 
of the Middle Ages when emperors began to view their territories as though they were 
tangible, secular political bodies Boundaries were drawn around specific nations and 
those not identifying with the ruling nation were denied rights, excommunicated, or even 
purged. Many European countries came close to realizing the modern ideal; the nation 
and the state overlapped so closely that they became inextricably linked. 
The [d]evolution of Europe into self-contained spheres engendered not only 
modern nation-states but also modem nationalism. Lines drawn around peoples of 
similar ancestry helped to crystallize a fermenting in-group/out-group mentality across 
the continent. Any prior tendencies to distinguish 'us' from 'them' could now be 
confirmed by the political boundaries dividing disparate groups. Persecution of a foreign 
'other' could potentiafly be legitimized publicly by asserting national sovereignty within 
state borders. 'Justification' for persecution of this kind was especially problematic for 
people groups such as Jewish communities who could not claim any territory as their 
own. Nevertheless, this is the way in which Europe chose to define its political bodies up 
into the 20'" century. 
The Postmodern State 
The way in which each society determines the form a state will take is not 
predetermined. Five hundred years ago Europe created the nation-state but fifty years 
ago it began developing a new form of government. Europe's transformation reveals that 
states are constantly changing and at any time may choose to take on a new shape. 
States, as is clear from the EU, are not absolute, stagnate entities with clearly defined 
borders. In fact, states are not 'real' entities at all but 'imagined communities" 
(Anderson) The people of each state believe there is a tie that binds all members 
together; and this belief persists "regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that 
may prevail in each" (7). An imagined tie or sense of membership with others of similar 
language, ancestry, or ethnicity is what constitutes a nation. Each individual within state 
boundaries need not see its borders nor do they need to personally interact with all other 
citizens. The community they experience flourishes even though it is not perceptible. 
Thus, a nation-state is an entity with imagined boundaries, imagined individuals within 
those boundaries, and imagined relationships or affiliations among those people. 
Given that the nation-state is not a real or tangrible political body but an imagined 
one, it is not surprising that the borders that once defined our world are beginning to 
fade. Technological inventions facilitate this process. Television, media, and the Internet 
all work together to create a virtual environment in which citizens interact with their 
governments. The state and its representative bodies have themselves become a 
'representation' of reality. Technology allows individuals to transcend time and space. 
Europeans can actually explore EU institutions and policies, read the acquis 
communitaire, participate in discussions and polls, and contact their representatives all 
via the Internet. It is now possible to be a citizen of one nation-state but participate in the 
activities ol'other citizenry across the globe. The declining importance of national 
boundaries is especially clear in the European Union where every citizen of a member 
state is simultaneously a citizen of the Union and travel between states is enjoyed freely. 
Because the nation-state is no longer tightly contained (and never truly was)h political 
territories must be reestablished and membership redefined. 
Time in Motion 
In addition to heing a postmodern state, the EU has produced a postmodern 
'history. In modem thought, history is perceived to be linear, as though it exists on a 
time continuum where one event follows closely after and results from all those before 
it. Historical events are recorded meticulously and proclaimed to be an accurate account 
' For more on the development of a postmodern state, see Rogers Brubaker*s tyorronalrsm Reframed and 
Yasemin Soysal's Lrmirr of('i(r=errvitrp 
of what has occurred. In contrast, stories created by people groups and passed down 
through generations are considered fiction. Local myths and legends might be based on 
real occurrences but are not truth. On the other hand, history as it is written in historical 
records is thought to be absolute; it provides the foundation for what is to come. 
According to postmodern theorists, however, history is no better than a fable. Its 
storytellers, like those who pass down oral traditions, have preconceived ideas and 
beliefs that shape their perception of events. Their imaginings of the truth are distorted 
reproductions of what really occurred; and their expressions of those ideas in wnting, a 
second copy. Thus, when an 'historical' event is finally presented on a page, it is not 
simply a watered down version of the facts but rather a representation at least twice 
removed from reality. "Postmodernism declares the 'end of history'. . . by rejecting the 
notion of history as a umtary process with the 'West' at the political center of gravity" 
(van Ham, g). History, therefore, is a social creation, a story, a fictional account; it does 
not exist as an absolute And historical events cannot be envisioned as stagnate points on 
a time continuum but as constantly moving through space, never pinned down to a 
specific location. 
It is not the case that history was permanent and absolute in the modern era and 
only now has it become untrustworthy. On the contrary, the instability of historical facts 
has always been. Postmodernity has simply brought it to light as some philosophers, 
poets, and other academics have begun to recognize its impermanence. The unreliability 
of historical facts has become especially clear in the second half of the 20a' century as 
non-Western peoples have begun to protest the biased view of the Western, dominant 
version of history. 
Even though they live in a postmodern age in which history has been re- 
envisioned, Europeans, in general, are still historically minded. Their experiences in the 
past, specifically the Great Wars of the 20th century, affect their mindsets, beliefs, and 
ways of life in the present. Ol course, one European's past, especially as it relates to the 
wars, varies greatly from another. And each European country has a unique collective 
history. So how would it be possible for all European histories- both the German and the 
French histories, for example- to serve as the foundation for the European Union? How 
can two or more countries with a bloody past that is deeply rooted in division have as 
their starting point unification? 
The founding fathers of the ECSC must have perceived this dilemma as they 
began to construct the Union, and their successors continued in the traditions they 
established. The EU was not built on a shared history because those involved did not 
have a common past that would lead to unification. Rather it seems the opposite is true. 
The purpose of the ECSC- umfication- was a backlash against Europe's divisive past. 
European visionaries did not choose 'reality' as their starting point in time- that is, 
reality as it is recorded in the history books- nor did they follow linearly after the series 
of events of the 20fa century. Instead Europe chose to found its institutions on the myth 
ol'European unity, which had often been envisioned but never realized. The leaders of 
For the myth of Europe, see Robert Darton's "Euro State of Mind" 
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Europe rejected modernity's logic and proclaimed that which was once considered fable 
to be truth, They declared a futuristic utopia to be their past and began moving forward. 
Progression 
In the modem era, states are built on a foundation, whether it is a Constitution, an 
ideology, or a monarch. The EU has no such foundation The creation of a Constitution 
has been debated but never resolved. Therefore, for fifty years the Union has existed 
propelled by treaties alone. Fach successive treaty either nullifies or builds on 
those before it with no standard set of rules to follow or pnnciples to incorporate. The 
IJnion chooses to entitle its entire body of laws, rules, treaties, regulations, and directives 
the acquis communitaire' a jumble of laws that are constantly interacting with and 
drawing from each other and at any moment may reach their pinnacle achievement or 
lose all importance in the Union. For example, the treaty that founded the ECSC recently 
expired but time and official expiration dates are less important in a postmodern state In 
fact, the purpose of the ECSC had faded long before, as it was superseded by many 
subsequent treaties. The only body of law that is actually safeguarded by the Union and 
serves as a basis for its actions is the United Nations Charter on Human Rights but this 
piece of writing finds its greatest purpose in setting the standard for human rights that 
prospective Member States must achieve before they are allowed to enter into the Union. 
In its common use, the UN Charter acts more as a symbol of democracy than as a 
sculptor of Union law. At its root, then, the Union has no groundwork, just as it has no 
historical beginning from which it grows. In postmodernity, this is the optimal mode of 
government. The absence of a framework gives the EU room for constant progression. 
The means by which states come to participate in the Union is also a postmodern 
phenomenon. Modern states are created and expanded through force. They gain territory 
by invading and conquering militarily weaker lands. Voluntary surrender is virtually 
unheard of because states are reluctant to give up their national sovereignty. In the EU, 
what was hitherto unheard of has become common occurrence. States are not forced to 
join the Union but rather they ask to be a part of it. Prospective members in the East are 
conforming their countries to the standards set by the EU and willingly sacrificing some 
measure of sovereignty for the opportunity to share in what the EU has to offer its 
Members, especially in the rewards of a single market. At the same time because 
membership is voluntary not compulsory, states may also opt to leave the Union at any 
time. Of course, regaining membership might be difficult if a state has proven they. may 
not fully commit. Nonetheless, it is the decision of each state to join and to disjom from 
the Union. 
The world has never witnessed a supranational authority offering voluntary 
involvement to its participants. There are no military troops driving states to enact EU 
law. Instead, states have economic and ideological incentives that compel them to go 
along as well as the belief that a divided Europe will be less prosperous and more prone 
to engage in war than one that is unified. States enact EU law because they know it is in 
their national interest to move toward unification. They will even pay the fines imposed 
on them by the European Court of Justice for breaking Union law in expectation that 
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other states will reciprocate their measure of good faith. In fact, the Member states are so 
eager to create common laws and practices with their neighbors that many have de facto 
implemented the tenets of the Nice Treaty even though it was not ratified in 2001. In 
this way, unhke in a modern state, the Members of the EU enact legislation, pay taxes, 
and in other ways surrender sovereignty to a supranational government institution. 
In the same way that states may willingly enter into the Umon so are they free to 
exit. In a modern state, territory is not relinquished unless it becomes more trouble than 
it is worth (and even then it is often not surrendered) or is taken away. For example, 
when the southern states in the United States of America attempted to secede from the 
Union, the U S. government denied them this demand and civil war was the result. 
Participation in the EU, on the other hand, is a choice. Member States are only bound by 
a treaty, which means their individual state governments may choose to renege or nullify 
if it suits their national interests. The European Union is a postmodern political 
institution because it allows states the freedom to choose the way in which their state 
will develop, to associate or disassociate with the Union, to relinquish or retain 
sovereignty, to embrace a European identity or be content with a national one. 
Postmodernity creates a forum void of certainties and have-tos where individuals and 
states are at liberty to delme themselves and can have fluid, dynamic, and multi-layered 
identities. The FU takes on the qualities of the postmodern era and presents this political 
space to the nations ofboth Western and Eastern Europe in the hope that peace will be 
the result. 
' The public in the Republic of ireland did not ratify the Nice Treaty when it waa put to a vote 
Multiplicity 
The postmodern era has revealed that it is impossible to wrap up individuals in 
neat little packages. Broad sweeping generalizations about categories of people are 
politically incorrect and often untrue. The site of identity, therefore, is not metaphysical 
or supranational, but rather it is local. Additionally, each person cannot be summed up 
into one identity category. A sister may also be a mom, a libertarian, and a garbage 
collector. Each of those identities exist within and define one person; and each one is 
likely to transform, fragment, or disappear at any moment. One individual may even 
have dialectical identity markers, such as enemy and friend. A postmodern political 
institution, then, must provide outlets on a local level for individuals with multiple, 
mutable identities. 
In the context of the European Union, it is of'ten cultural identities that must be 
contended with since each citizen of the EU is a composite of a local, regional, national, 
and European identity. Some citizens may in fact claim more than one of these identities 
or may have a feeling of membership to a foreign country. Obviously, if the EU is to be 
effective, it must be open to a citizenry of multiple identities and attune to their needs at 
a grassroots level. Voices from every location in Europe must find a forum in the Union. 
The EU has taken signilicant strides to conquer identity politics within its 
borders. First, it has attempted to institutionalize a European identity. Many Europeans 
have historically felt a cultural connection to each other that they do not share with other 
nations. Extensive vacations, coffee on a veranda, and workers' rallies are just a few 
examples. The Union formalizes that shared identity by creating a European 
government, tlag, and anthem. Second, national identity is not strained by the institution 
of a European one. National governments still exist and exercise authority over their 
citizens and also have a significant role in the European system Heads of state make up 
the Council of Europe and the nation-state is the political sovereign responsible for 
enacting the regulations agreed upon at the European level. The EU may create and 
adjudicate legislation, but it is left to the states to implement the decisions. For example, 
each Member State has its own education system but the EU unifies these independent 
systems by creating a system of equivalencies to be used at the intergovernmental or 
supranational level. Third, and maybe most impressively, the Union offers a space for 
local and regional political voices to be heard through the Committee of Regions. There 
are 222 members in the CoR each representing a specific region of Europe. The role of 
the committee is twofold; to express local and regional needs at the level of the Union 
and to educate their constituencies about relevant European law. As stipulated in the 
Maastricht Treaty, the CoR must be consulted on all issues that might affect local or 
regional politics. Lastly, the needs of the individual, if not met by any of the overarching 
institutions, may be expressed to the European ombudsman whose job it is to attend to 
the personal requests of European citizens. Europe has set m place institutions for 
multiple identity markers and has not neglected the importance of local foci. 
POSTMODERN IDENTITIES 
The European Union has developed into a postmodern political institution as it 
has been influenced by an increasingly postmodern world. The same effect can be found 
among seynents of the European population While some individuals cling ever more 
tightly to their modern roots, others have embraced the postmodern world with all of its 
uncertainties. The result has been unique cleavages in Europe that determine Europeans' 
support for further integration. 
Postmaterialist vs. Materialist 
The traditional means of identifying Europeans as they relate to the European 
Union is to determine whether they are europeanist, nationalists, or ambivalents. In fact, 
this is the most obvious cleavage that would emerge when exploring factors determining 
support for the Union. However, recent attempts have been made to understand 
individuals and the European Union based on their degree of postmodernism. Ronald 
Inglehart posits an alternative way to conceptualize European identities as either 
postmaterialists or materialists. In his opinion a postmaterialist has postmodern values, 
such as protecting freedom of speech, beautifying the environment, and creating a more 
humane, less nnpersonal world. A materialist, in contrast, has modern values, such as 
order, stability, and prosperity. A postmaterialist is considered more favorable toward 
the European Union than a materialist. Additionally, Inglehart prescribes that a 
postmaterialist feels a certain level of economic stability and order already in the world, 
and thus is given thc luxury of being able to value nonmaterial things like quality of 
life. Whereas in the spirit of Maslow's hierarchy of needs, the materialist is inclined to 
first pursue the basic material social needs before desiring postmaterial ones. 
Inglehart's desire to understand European identities in terms of postmodern 
thought is a worthy objective, for a postmodern individual may respond differently than 
a modern one to a postmodern political institution such as the EU. However, lnglehart's 
postmaterialist-materialist argument inadequately addresses the shift from modern to 
postmodern. Postmodernism is not just about what one values in the world; it is a 
reflection of how one envisions the self and its place in the world. Specifically, 
postmodernism posits that identities are fragmented, multiform, impermanent, and 
socially constructed. It claims that selves are not composed of essential identities 
unchanged since birth Instead, the self consists of an array of identities, some 
complementing and others contradicting each other; and all are subject to be changed by 
the influences of society and other individuals. Inglehart does not address these key 
principles belonging to a postmodern perception of identity. 
Inglehart also does not analyze the effects that a world of unreality and language 
games may have on European identities. Postmodernism claims that the world is so 
consumed by images that it is no longer possible to determine what is false and what is 
real. In fact, that which we proclaim to be real is often actually a constructed reality. Not 
just what we see and experience is socially constructed but also what we say. The words 
that we use in everyday life have a fabricated meaning, not an inherent one. Words are 
created by society so that ideas can be communicated, but interpretation of their 
meanings are still subjective. All words have a unique significance to their 
communicator that is different from the meaning understood by the hearer. Language 
discrepancies can be reduced but never erased. Any theory of postmodern identity must 
consider that a postmodernist recognizes and embraces unreality in the world and 
language. 
Like the world and language, states are also socially constructed entities, created 
to maintain peace and order. Thomas Hobbes calls his conception of thc state, Leviathan, 
because of its mighty and fearsome power over its citizens. Europe has labeled its state 
the European Union because of its objective to bring peace and harmony to the 
continent. Though Hobbes' state was a lictional theoretical model and the EU is an 
actual political institution, the two are not so different; both are social creations- 
imaginings of how the world should function. Similarly, the nation is a fabricated body 
of individuals, what 13enedict Arnold calls an "imagined community. ' Likcncsscs and 
connections between individuals which make up their national bonds are imagined. 
Certain circumstances lead to the development of a national identity among a particular 
group of people and each individual's feeling of membership to the group. Thus, both 
the state and the nation which bind us together with other member's of our community 
are fabricated entities. A postmodernist recognizes the ephemeral and constructed nature 
of both the nation-state and the FU, a concept that Inglehart does not mclude in his 
postmaterialist definition. 
An additional criticism of Inglehart's argument is his belief that only those 
societies or individuals that arc prosperous and stable will be able to have postmodern 
values. Clearly postcolonialists would find this statement degrading, for many residents 
of former colonies have been some of the staunchest supporters of and greatest 
contributors to the postmodern movement. Yet, inconsistent with Inglehart*s argument, 
their societies are far from having the order and sound economy that is necessary, 
according to Inglehart, to have postmodern values. Postmodernism is a state of mind that 
need not follow after financial and military security. Individuals from all types ol 
surroundings may recognize the instability inherent in their own identities and in the 
v'orld. 
Postmodern vs. Modern 
Based on a firm understanding of postmodernism, European identities can be 
described in an alternative fashion to that otTered by Inglehart. First, the traditional 
Europeanist, ambivalent, and nationalist identifications can be classified as either 
modern or postmodern Additionally, two new postmodern identities may be found 
alongside the traditional three: the dual identifier and the non-identifier. Table 4. 1 
demonstrates the identification of each European identity type with Europe and the 
nation. 
To ascertain the existence of these live European identity types, Eurobarometer 
data was analyzed. In this public opinion survey, individuals were asked questions 
regarding their relationship to the nation and the EU. Selected questions focused on their 
identification with and pride in the nation and EU. 
4. 1 Five European Identity Types 
European 
Identity 
National 
Identity 
As expected, a europeanist identifies entirely with the EU (not with the nation) 
and is proud of the EU (not ol the nation) while a nationalist identifies with and is proud 
of only the nation. An ambivalent identifier moderately identifies with both. In addition 
to these identities, a dual-identifier exists who identifies entirely with both the EU and 
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the nation and a non-identifier who identifies with neither political institution. Each of 
these identity types can be categorized as either modern or postmodern. 
National Identifier 
The nationalist is a modern individual because he is attached to the nation-state, 
which is a modern phenomenon, constructed by society during a particular era to 
distinguish one section of the globe from another. It is a designation of geographic, 
cultural, and collective identity traits. The nationalist identifies solely with his national 
identity and finds his self-worth in national pride. He feels no attachment to local or 
European concerns but only to the familiar boundaries of the modern era. He is fighting 
against a postmodern world by refusing to be a part of it and instead clinging ever more 
strongly to a stable modern world, which provides him with a safe, haven from the 
'Others he so greatly fears. 
Eu ropean Identifier 
The European Identifier could be modem. It is possible that he views the EU as 
the next logical step in a progression Irom nation-state to supranational state. He may 
translate the borders of the nation-state- those defined lines that keep 'Others' out and 
contain one* s own identity withm- to that of Europe so that now it is no longer France 
versus every other country in the world but rather Europe versus any foreign 'Other. ' 
"Turning 'Europeanness' into a postmodern badge of privilege and superiority, a new 
marker of pride and dignity, would risk emulating the trappings of nationalism on a 
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European level" (Van Ham 73). Though this is a possible interpretation of the European 
identifier, it is highly unlikely. For the European identifier to be modern he must have a 
very strong nationalistic tie to Europe; and his European pride must be juxtaposed with 
disdain for foreign nations. He would see himself positioned in the heart of Europe 
looking out toward strange foreigners. But the EU does not create this personality. 
According to Timothy Garton-Ash, "There is no European demos" so there is no 
imagined community to which all Europeans belong. Also, the European identity seems 
inwardly focused, based not on the construction of a wall around all of Europe but on the 
destruction of walls within Europe. Because the EU works to blur the boundaries 
between modern nation-states, those who identify with it are rejecting modernism and 
embracing a postmodern world with permeable, unstable boundaries. 
Ambivalent Identifier 
At first glance the ambivalent identifier seems postmodern. He is uncertain about 
his connection to governments and collective identities and is unwilling to completely 
deline himself by his locality, region, nation or Europe. But in actuality he is a 
modernist. The ambivalent identifier has not completely rejected modern ideals, as the 
non-identifier has, nor has he fully embraced all elements ofhis identity like the 
multiple-identifier. Instead, he is in limbo. The hesitation to fully commit to either 
Europe or his nation signifies that the ambivalent identifier is disillusioned with modern 
society but unwilling to give it up. David Riesman argues that in a modern world, 
individuals necessarily conform to find a place in the society in which they live. "In 
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order that any society may function well, its members must acquire the kind of character 
which makes them wun/ to act in the way they have to act as members of the society or 
of a special class within it. They must desire what is objectively necessary for them to 
do" (Riesman 5). But what if the roles that individuals in society are supposed to play 
are not clearly defined. Living in a postmodern world, modern man becomes 
disillusioned. He is bombarded by virtual images and constantly reminded that 
boundaries and institutions are not permanent, fixed entities What if society itself is 
constantly a blur, a simulacrum, so that its members cannot locate their places? It is 
practically impossible to avoid contact with these everyday reminders and this makes the 
modern man uneasy. He deeply desires for his world to be stable and clearly defined and 
wishes he could say, ? Yes I'm a Frenchman and yes I'm proud of my country, " but in 
light of postmodernism he cannot convince himself that his world is really so concrete. 
Non-Identifier 
The non-identifier is a pessimistic/cynical postmodernist who finds no value in 
labels and in fact feels constrained by them. The non-identifier is an individual. Shc 
chooses not to define herself by the government under which she lives. The context and 
meaning of 'Europe* or 'France' is subjective anyway and constantly changing. Any 
attactuuent to these shape-shifting concepts would be meaningless. In the spirit of 
Baudrillard, the non-Identifier believes that 'reality' as we know it is in fact a 
simulation, or "simulacrum. " Specifically, nations do not exist until they are drawn on a 
map. '*Henceforth, it is the map that proceeds the territory. . . it is the map that engenders 
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the temtory. . . " (Baudrillard 2). Finding one's self-worth in a socially constructed, 
momentary entity such as a nation would be absurd. 
Dual Identifier 
The dual identifier is postmodern. An individual might characterize herself as 
equally a Venetian, an Italian, and a European. The dual identifier believes her identity 
does not have to be singular but can be a conglomeration of many parts, some 
overlapping and others contradicting each other. Chantal Mouffe declares, "It is 
therefore impossible to speak of the social agent as if we werc dealing with a unified, 
homogeneous entity. We have rather to approach it as a plurality. . . this plurality does 
not involve the coerrsrence, one by one, of a plurality of subject positions but rather the 
constant subversion and overdetermination of one by the others" (Mouffe 372). The dual 
identifier does not find it problematic that she wholeheartedly identifies with the EU 
even though some of its policies do not benefit her nation. Nor is she disturbed that he is 
greatly attached to a nation that sacrifices some of its sovereignty for the good of 
Europe. She recognizes and embraces the many aspects of her identity even though some 
may be diametrically opposed. 
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DATA TESTS AND RESULTS 
Identities: Support for Ell Policies 
European identities are more complex than the traditional European-national 
cleavage portrays. An understanding of postmodernism reveals an entirely new vision of 
the European constituency. One that imagines them belonging to one of five identity 
types and not simply to the traditional three. To appreciate the significance of this 
breakdown across the five identity types, and specifically the importance of recognizing 
the two new postmodern identity types, each identity's support for the EU across issue 
domains is analyzed. By looking at the identity types* stance on EU policies using 
Eurobarometer data, the importance of the five types becomes evident. 
The five identity types are divided into two camps with the ambivalent identifier 
usually falling somewhere in the middle. The dual identifier and the europeanist 
comprise the pro-EU camp while the non-identifier and the nationalist belong to the pro- 
nation camp. As graph 5. I illustrates, the dual identifier is more supportive of EU 
expansion than the Europeanist in four policy domains: enlargement, EU sovereignty, 
protection, and reform. On the other side, the non-identifier is the least favorable 
identifier toward to the EU on reform, protection, and enlargement policies. It is, 
therefore, not the case that european identifiers are most supportive and nationalists least 
supportive of EU expansionist policies as the traditional view would advocate. Instead, 
the dual and non-identifiers are equally important to the progress of European 
integration. Therefore, it is critical that the European public be viewed, engaged, and 
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Identities; Influence in European Institutions 
The implications of this finding are numerous. For example, understanding 
European identity can directly impact policy concessions in the European Council and in 
the Parliament. When trying to build a qualified majority of Member States' votes in the 
Council and EP, states must oflen make compromises in order to convince others to join 
their side. On policies that are salient to a Member State's public, policy concessions are 
targeted toward mass opinion. For this reason, it is necessary to know the make-up of a 
Member State's constituency: who is pro-European and who is not. In addition, one must 
know the influence each European identity type has within a Member State's population. 
If the segment of the population represented by an identity type is insignificant, then it 
may be futile to sway their opinion. Conversely, if an identity type's proportion of the 
population is momentous, then an attempt must be made to appease Europeans having 
that identity type. 
In order to assess the influence of each Member State's identity types in both the 
Council and EP, their votes have been weighted according to each type's percentage of a 
Member State's population, the votes needed for a qualified majority (QMV), and the 
Member State's weighted vote m each political institution. The formula is as follows: 
Council 
¹ ot'res ondents v ith identit t e 
total respondents in Member State 
~ C 6\ 7m 67 
¹ of votes for QMV (62) 
Member State' s 
weighted vote 
Parliament 
¹ of res ondents with identit t e 
total respondents in Member State 
EP 626 
¹ of votes for QMV (314) 
Member State's ¹ 
of votes 
I ra European Identifier 
, U Dual Idenrt ter 
: In ~violent Identifier 
I 
5 Non-identifier 
~ taNaaonal Identtaer 
The bar graphs reveal that in many Member States, the dual and non-identiliers 
rcpt'cscnt a gl'cater' Butnbcl' of wciglttctl votes thall the other three idcntitfcs. In Gcf many, 
for example„ the non-identifier accounts for over 5. 5 votes while the other member of'its 
camp, the nationahst, has less than 2 votes in the Council. Thus, to appease the anti-ElJ 
camp in Germany, It Is the non-Identifier who must be targeted and not the nationalist. 
8 Eurnpean Identtrter 
Ct Dual Identlrter 
at rtrnnitrtatent Identtrter 
8 Nnn-Identtfier 
te ~anat Identifier 
Similar judgments cmt be made about each of the other Member States and about the 
graph representing votes in the EP (grraph 5. 3j. The graphs portray the signiftcant roles 
that dual and non-Identtfiers play m the Ebl demston-makmg process. Thetr wmghty 
influences in the Council and EP force policy-makers to take their opinions into account 
when pursuing the further widening and deepening of' the El k 
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CONC r. vsioN 
The evidence suggests that postmodernism has had a tremendous impact on the 
development of European political institutions and identities in the mass public. Two 
postmodern identities, a dual and a non-identifier, exist alongside the Europeanist and 
the nationalist in the Member States of the European Union. The non-identifier often 
shov s even greater support for the nation than the national identifier does. The dual 
identifier oscillates between camps often showing even greater support for the EU than 
the european identifier when favoring a European identity. 
Recognizing the presence of these postmodern identities is crucial for coalition 
building in the Council. As Heads of State make concessions to their fellow Council 
members in order to obtain the qualified majority necessary to pass policies, they must 
know the composition of each Member State's population. The most effective 
compromises will target the group of individuals within a Member State that has the 
greatest impact on that state's policy decisions. As the data suggests, it is the dual and 
the non-identifiers who represent the greatest number of weighted votes in Council. 
Further research may explore the affect of these five identity types on specific 
issue domains and across Member States. Why are dual identifiers more supportive of 
European integration than European identifters on issues of enlargement, sovereignty, 
protection, and reform? Why are non-identifiers least supportive on issues of 
enlargement, protection, and reform? Is there a quality inherent in these policies that 
encourages a strong positive response from constructive postmodernists and a strong 
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negative response from cynical postmodernists. Why does Germany have such a high 
percentage of non-identifiers in its population while Spain is comprised of a large group 
of dual identifiers? Additionally, interesting trends have been discovered regarding 
Member States' support for EU enlargement. It appears that european identifiers in the 
original six states of the European Coal and Steel Community are unexpectedly 
insupportive of enlargement compared to those states that joined the F uropean 
Community at a later date. Other similar trends may be found by conducting further 
research based on the five identity types of the European Union. 
The results of this Eurobarometcr data analysis offer a more precise description 
of identities within the European Union. They suggest that the dual and the non- 
identifier, which are unique additions to political theory, are in fact the most critical 
opponents and valiant supporters of EU policy. Further exploration of these identity 
types and the unique characterization of the EU as a postmodern political institution may 
offer insights into the continued deepening and widening of the Union and could 
contribute to an additional 50 years of peace in Europe. 
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